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A CENTURY OF NATIONAL PARK
CONFLICT: CLASS, GEOGRAPHY, AND
THE CHANGING VALUES OF
CONSERVATION DISCOURSE IN MAINE
BY ADAM AUERBACH

Conservation interests have been promoting the creation of a national park
in Maine’s North Woods for over one hundred years. Past park proposals
featured Mt. Katahdin, the Allagash River, and the greater North Woods
region, and each inspired fierce debate amongst Mainers. Most recently,
Maine’s North Woods have been gripped by a fervent debate surrounding
a proposal by Elliotsville Plantation, Inc. to create a small national park
to the east of Baxter State Park. What can the national park controversies
of northern Maine’s past teach us about the most recent debate? In northern
Maine, the national park controversies played out predominantly along
the lines of class and geography. Further, these social and geographic dynamics manifest through value conflicts that transcend mere economic concerns. However, economic development arguments increasingly dominate
the public justifications of both park supporters and opponents, uniquely
framing the current debate. The near-exclusive focus on economics in the
most recent debate narrows both sides’ collective engagement with the more
complex value dynamics that linger below the surface and in some ways
carry over from the region’s historical park debates. Adam Auerbach is a
2016 graduate of Bates College in Lewiston, where he studied environmental studies and American history. This piece is an abridged version of his
honors thesis of the same title, available online at http://scarab.bates.
edu/honorstheses/181/. He has held positions as an environmental educator
in Colorado employed at Rocky Mountain National Park, Chatfield State
Park, and Boulder County Parks and Open Space.

Introduction

I

N 2001, Gail Fanjoy, chairwoman for the Millinocket, Maine, town
council, unveiled the surprising contents of a 1937 time capsule originally buried underneath the town post office. The capsule contained a
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statement from the Millinocket Chamber of Commerce supporting the
creation of a national park surrounding Mt. Katahdin. Millinocket, in
1937, was over twenty years into public debate surrounding the first in a
series of contentious national park proposals to confront Maine’s North
Woods region. Over the next eighty years, similar proposals for the creation of a national park in northern Maine surfaced, with each proposal
capturing local and national attention and inspiring fierce discourse. The
most recent rendition of the area’s national park saga seemingly concluded on August 24, 2016 when President Barack Obama designated the
Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument during the last months
of his administration, finally establishing a national conservation site in
the North Woods after over one hundred years of efforts from conservation interests. Park supporters’ time for celebration, however, was short
lived. President Donald Trump, shortly after taking office, ordered his
Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, to “review” Katahdin Woods and
Waters, in addition to twenty-six other national monuments, with an eye
for potentially reducing the size of—or rescinding—some monuments.
With Maine’s new national monument only months old, its fate became
unclear, and northern Maine found itself plunged once more into a fervent park debate.1
Northern Maine’s first park debate, featuring Mt. Katahdin, began in
the 1910s and concluded by the late 1930s. National park controversy
struck the North Woods again in the 1950s and 1960s surrounding the Allagash River. Then, during the 1990s, a group called RESTORE: The North
Woods began promoting a 3.2 million-acre park proposal that they still
strive for today. Finally, over the last five years, a much smaller national
park proposal stemming from a group called Elliotsville Plantation, Inc.
(EPI) captured the public’s attention in northern Maine. What can the national park controversies of northern Maine’s past teach us about today’s
recently re-opened debate? In northern Maine, the national park controversies played out principally along the lines of class and geography. Further, these social and geographic dynamics have manifested through value
conflicts that cannot be reduced simply to economic concerns. However,
economic development arguments increasingly dominate the public justifications of both park supporters and opponents arguing their respective
positions in the most recent park discourse. The near-exclusive focus on
economics in the current debate narrows both sides’ collective engagement
with the more complex value dynamics that linger below the surface and
in some ways carry over from the region’s historical park debates.
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Elliotsville Plantation, Inc.’s land east of Baxter State Park. “Katahdin Woods &
Waters Recreation Area Map,” 2015. Printed with permission from Lucas St. Claire.
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Mt. Katahdin
The first national park proposal in the North Woods centered around
Maine’s highest and most iconic peak, Mt. Katahdin. In 1913, Frank
Guernsey, a Republican congressman from Dover–Foxcroft, Maine, introduced a bill in Congress to create a national park around the mountain.
This bill, and a similar one he introduced three years later, died in committee.2
The existence of a competing state park proposal soon colored the
Katahdin controversy. In 1919, Percival Baxter proposed a Mt. Katahdin
Centennial State Park to commemorate Maine’s one hundredth anniversary of statehood in 1920. Baxter’s measure never passed largely due to
firm opposition from the Great Northern Paper Company, the owner of
much of the land surrounding the summit. Two years later, after being
elected Governor, Baxter pressed again for a state park, but the president
of Great Northern, Garrett Schenck, held no interest in selling the land.
After Schenck’s death in 1928, the company became more open to the idea
of a state park. Baxter, unable to convince the state legislature to buy land
for a park, utilized his personal wealth and took on the task of conservation
personally. He purchased 5,760 acres from Great Northern in 1930, including Mt. Katahdin. Then, after Baxter deeded the land to the state, Baxter State Park officially came into existence in 1933.3
That same year, a conflicting vision for a federal park gained traction.
Many believed the state did not possess the resources to manage the mountain, and during 1933, Mainers voiced various proposals for a national forest or park. Governor Louis J. Brann advocated a one-million-acre Roosevelt National Park; at his prompting, the state legislature passed a bill
that allowed the federal government to purchase land in the region for a
national forest and park. This plan, however, never received serious attention from the federal government because the bill upheld Maine’s rights
to watersheds, dam sites, and water storage facilities on land slated for the
park.4
After this development, in 1936 and 1937, the park debate intensified.
During these years, Brann’s national park plan found a significant public
advocate in Myron Avery, a resident of Lubec considered to be the country’s leading expert on Mt. Katahdin. He served as president of the Appalachian Trail Conference and is today seen as the father of the Appalachian Trail, which reaches its northern terminus on Mt. Katahdin.
With the weight of the Appalachian Trail Conference behind him, Avery
authored many articles promoting a national rather than a state park op-
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tion for Mt. Katahdin. Baxter, who wished to safeguard and grow his fledgling state park, persisted as the chief opponent to Avery and other proponents of a national park in the region.5
Early in 1937, Avery found a crucial ally in his quest to create a national
park: United States congressman, Ralph Owen Brewster. Brewster, a former
Maine governor, remained a fierce political rival of Baxter and introduced
federal legislation to create a national park at Katahdin on March 23, 1937.
The debate surrounding the National Park bill pitted the two most prominent outdoor organizations in the Northeast against one another: the Appalachian Trail Conservancy supporting Avery, and the Appalachian
Mountain Club supporting Baxter.6
Class and geography inextricably shaped the debate surrounding the
fate of Katahdin. Maine political elites like Percival Baxter and Owen Brewster, as well as elite environmental interests like Myron Avery of the Appalachian Trail Conference and Ronald Gower of the Appalachian Mountain Club, dominated the Katahdin park discussion. Local working-class
people are absent from the historical record during the 1930s debate. Despite possible significant ramifications for these individuals, choosing between two conservation proposals inspired little interest, perhaps creating
a lesser-of-two-evils choice. As Congressman Brewster put it:
Everyone is agreed . . . that Mount Katahdin and the wild region surrounding it and all the beautiful vistas that are afforded across the hundreds of miles of Maine lakes and forests should be preserved untarnished for posterity. . . . The only question is the best method by which
this may be accomplished and its preservation guaranteed.

Brewster’s observation that “everyone” agreed that the region required conservation status oversimplified the situation. As previously indicated, Baxter’s earlier attempts to create a state park at Mt. Katahdin initially met
fierce resistance from paper companies and, one would assume, their
workers. However, given that the state park already existed, the debate centered around what model of conservation should be employed in the
Katahdin region, a conversation of interest mainly to conservation-minded
elites.7
Conservation-minded elites with similar values dominated both sides
of the Katahdin debate, and both sides appealed primarily to the value of
wilderness recreation. The main point of contention persisted on whether
the National Park Service or the Baxter State Park Commission could better manage the land and mountain. Both sides contended that their model
provided the best quality of recreational experience for parkgoers. For ex-
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ample, national park supporters argued that the state had poorly executed
stewardship of the land thus far and did not possess the financial resources
to properly do so in the future. They contended that the area faced ruin
under inadequate state management against ever increasing visitation.
Avery deplored that, “No expenditure has been made by the state in connection with the area. . . . There is no custodian or anyone in the park area
to represent law or authority or to prevent depredations.” He continued,
“The stranger who is drawn to the region by its extensive publicity is astounded to find an utter lack of any public accommodations.” Avery also
noted that, under state management, the mountain’s trails had received no
maintenance and the park remained wholly unequipped to handle the four
hundred expected visitors over Labor Day weekend.8
Avery and Brewster painted a torrid picture of Mt. Katahdin under state
management and suggested that only National Park Service management
would improve the situation. Brewster explained, “A very modest request
of two thousand dollars to provide a caretaker for the Katahdin area at this
session of the [state] legislature was turned down because of the limitations
of finance in the present precarious financial conditions of the state.” Brewster then speculated that the state did not wish—or have the means—to
set a precedent for adequately funding the park. He offered this thought
in contrast to the situation in the recently established Acadia National Park
where the federal government provided “fifty to a hundred thousand dollars” to care for the park. For Brewster and Avery, only the federal government contained the financial infrastructure to steward the Katahdin region
properly.9
National park opponents, on the other hand, argued that the federal
government would overdevelop the area and spoil its wilderness qualities.
For instance, Baxter exclaimed, “To commercialize this magnificent area,
to desecrate it with ‘great hotels’ with their noisy social life, their flaming
signs, the roar of motor cars and airplanes coming and going to break the
peace of that great solitude would be nothing less than sacrilege.” Ronald
L. Gower, editor of the Appalachian Mountain Club’s Katahdin Guide and
another vocal national park opponent, agreed with Baxter that a national
park would ruin the mountain with overdevelopment. He argued:
It should always be borne in mind that this region has not yet been set
apart for the type of use and development that exists in the National
Parks. This is a wilderness area from which motor cars and all that they
mean are forever barred by the terms of the gift to the state. No highways,
no great log hotels, no skyline drives, no summit roads, no noisy social
life, no flaming signs, no semi-commercialized recreation, no roar of civilization, no orders from Washington.
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Gower’s words also signal a dislike or distrust of the federal government,
a value that, as we will see, Mainers held throughout a century of national
park discourse.10
Editorials also frequently expressed an anti-development sentiment.
Opponents disdained national parks, in particular, for the hotels and hotdog stands they believed would arrive with national park creation. For example, one 1937 editorial read:
This position [of opposing a national park] is based upon sincere love of
Mt. Katahdin and upon perception of the fact that a ‘developed’ national
park with hotels, hot-dog stands, trailer camps, postcard emporia, and all
the other paraphernalia for catering to popular taste as exemplified in the
Yellowstone, the Yosemite, and other national parks would spoil the sylvan
solitude and majestic aloofness of Maine’s great mountain.

In addition to disputing whether the state or National Park Service
would better manage the wilderness experience on the mountain, the elite
figures in the debate also quarreled about whether management of Mt.
Katahdin should exist primarily for a national or Maine audience. National
park supporters argued that the region transcended local significance and,
therefore, needed to be managed in the best interest of people across the
country. Avery authored an article, which appeared in the 1937 edition of
Nature Magazine, extolling the reasons he believed Mt. Katahdin to be of
national significance. He pointed to many features of the area, including
wilderness characteristics, geology, floral and faunal life, and historical associations with Henry David Thoreau. Avery explained that he viewed the
national park bill as a matter of whether:
in central Maine, we shall create, while yet we may, a large area to be forever preserved as a wilderness, as symbolic of this country in its earliest
days, as a heritage of the American people, and for the benefit of the
United States as a whole and not for the particular county or state in
which such an area is located.

Elsewhere, Avery made this sentiment more explicit. He wrote, “Katahdin
and the Katahdin area belong not only to the people of Maine but to the
United States.” Despite being born and raised in Maine, Avery believed
Katahdin should be managed for a national audience.11
National park opponents disputed Avery’s interest in inviting those
from away to enjoy Katahdin. Generally, they liked that a state park did
not encourage access to the area by out-of-state tourists and that local officials managed the mountain for Mainers. Further, national park oppo-
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nents often showed interest in keeping the federal government out of the
area. Baxter himself said, “This mountain is the property of the people of
Maine forever to be held by the state for their benefit.” Baxter continued
by explicitly outlining that his vision for the mountain contained no place
for federal presence: “As donor of this area I wished to do something that
for all time would benefit my native state. . . . In planning for this over all
those years my sole interest was in the state of Maine, not in the national
government.”12
Similarly, Ronald Gower advocated a state rather than national park
because “the control of a Maine park w[ould] remain in the hands of
Maine people.” Gower criticized national park supporters:
Now comes a group of people, most of whom live outside of New England, and practically all of whom are non-residents of Maine, who have
decided that this, Maine’s mountain, shall forthwith be a national park,
and they are determined to cram this national park bill down the throats
of the Maine people whether they like it or not.

State park proponents like Gower saw national park advocates as outsiders
wanting to usurp control of one of Maine’s natural treasures from local
residents.13
In sum, Maine elites contested the Katahdin park debate and appealed
primarily to the values of wilderness and recreation to justify their positions in relation to the proposed state and national parks. Further, these
elites appealed to the conflicting values of managing the mountain principally for a Maine audience or for a national audience. These values—
wilderness recreation and a preference towards management for a local or
national audience—remained a theme in northern Maine’s later park debates. In the end, Baxter’s state park model trumped the national park concept for the protection of Mt. Katahdin. Despite a spirited public debate,
Congress adjourned in June 1938 without considering Brewster’s bill.
Shortly thereafter, Baxter and Brewster mended their political relationship,
and Brewster agreed not to reintroduce the bill. Baxter, victorious, continued to purchase land around Katahdin with his personal fortune, donating
land to the state park until 1962. Today, the park stands at 209,644 acres,
a manifold increase on the near 6,000 acres Baxter purchased in 1930.14
The Allagash
Before Baxter purchased his final addition to Baxter State Park in 1962,
another North Woods national park controversy arose. The debate sur-
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Proposed border of the Allagash National Riverway. A Report on the Proposed Allagash National Riverway, 1963, by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Collections of the Maine Historical Society.

rounding the Allagash River represented more complex social and geographic issues than simply deciding whether the river should be home to
a national or state park. The Allagash issue, spanning the late 1950s and
early 1960s, involved competing dam proposals, three unique overtures
from the National Park Service, and various models of conservation based
on state management or state–federal partnership.
The Allagash controversy began in 1955 after the Army Corps of Engineers proposed a hydroelectric power dam at Rankin Rapids on the St.
John River. The Rankin Rapids Dam project aimed to create a reservoir in
both the upper St. John and nearby Allagash Rivers. In the face of this
threat, the Maine State Park Commission called for protection of the Allagash by state ownership in 1956. That same year, the Maine Fish and
Game association suggested an undeveloped national park to protect the
wilderness corridor along the river. A year later, the National Park Service
responded by creating a proposal for a 750,000-acre Allagash National
Park. The Park Service reviewed this plan internally and shared it with
Maine state agencies, but eventually decided to withdraw the plan and
never officially released it to the public.15
In 1960, after canoeing the Allagash, Supreme Court Justice William O.
Douglas tried to enlist an aging Percival Baxter to support the protection

National Park Conflict

85

of the Allagash under the Baxter State Park Authority, because Douglas
believed Mainers likely would resist federal management. His proposition
never gained any serious consideration; however, it did introduce the idea
of state protection of the river to the public. The National Park Service, in
1961, made public plans for a 246,000-acre Allagash National Recreation
Area to “make sure that the wilderness character of the finest canoe route
in the Northeast is preserved.” The same year, State Senator Edward Cyr
of Madawaska introduced a bill asserting a different wilderness vision for
the Allagash. His bill embraced the idea of a “working wilderness” favored
by the landowners in the area, which maintained state control and allowed
for more timber harvesting than a national park.16
The 1963 introduction of another National Park Service proposal and
two more proposed dams complicated this situation further. The new Park
Service plan called for a smaller 150,000-acre Allagash National Riverway
than the 246,000-acre national recreation area proposed two years prior.
The new federal Dickey–Lincoln dam proposal modified the earlier Rankin
Rapids proposal, calling for a dam on the St. John, but in an alternate position that would flood the St. John and leave the Allagash unaffected. The
second dam proposal of 1963 introduced a state-controlled dam option.
This option, called the Cross Rock Dam, would provide revenue to the
state, but at the cost of transforming the Allagash, as one environmentalist
explained, into a “vast deadwater reservoir with stinking mud flats and
barren gravel bars.” By the end of 1963, Maine faced the choice between
three dam projects, the most recent National Park Service plan and various
state and private working-wilderness solutions for the Allagash River.17
The 1963 state legislature considered a weak bill influenced greatly by
industrial lobbyists. It aimed to create tax programs promoting vague
“wilderness” easements that did not forbid harvesting timber or extracting
minerals. Crucially, it also did not restrict flowage rights, meaning the
Cross Rock Dam still persisted as a possibility under this bill. The environmental protection the bill afforded the Allagash remained so minimal
that Secretary of the Interior Steward Udall contacted Maine Governor
John Reed letting him know that, should the bill pass, the federal government would intervene. The question of the Allagash remained unanswered.18
Meanwhile, the promoters of the Cross Rock Dam, knowing the project
would ruin canoe recreation on the Allagash, announced their intentions
to build a new twenty-thousand-acre recreation park to draw hundreds of
thousands of visitors to camp near, and boat on, the artificial reservoir created by the dam, deemed the Grand Allagash Lake. The complex would
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offer infrastructure, such as marinas, trailer parks, boat launches, and cottages. Now, in addition to the slew of economic and conservation schemes
for the Allagash, the public grappled with the question of what kind of
recreation and tourism to allow in the area. Protection of the Allagash
would continue to offer a rugged wilderness canoe excursion accessible to
a limited class of experienced outdoorspeople on a naturally flowing river.
The Cross Rock proposal, on the other hand, offered the possibility of mass
tourism and recreation on an artificially created lake.19
Unlike the debate over the management of Mt. Katahdin, the discourse
regarding the Allagash significantly included the voices from the forest
products industry and local working-class people that opposed government conservation measures, especially from the federal government. Additionally, local elites did not drive support for a federal park on the Allagash; instead, the park idea originated and found its most ardent support
in the Department of Interior.20
National park supporters, like those in the Katahdin debate, appealed
primarily to the value of wilderness recreation. The National Park Service
proposal made it clear the value of a national riverway involved recreation.
It defined the Allagash as “a major recreation resource of great potential
significance to the Nation,” and indicated, “the purpose of an Allagash National Riverway would be to insure an area in the eastern United States of
sufficient size and quality where present and future generations may experience a primitive North Woods canoeing adventure.” The national riverway and recreation area proposals extolled the recreational value of the
Allagash. The recreation area proposal, for example, highlighted the fauna
an Allagash paddler could spot: “To traverse Allagash trails and waterways
is also to encounter birds and animals of many kinds, for this lake-filled
land is a reservoir of northern wildlife.”21
The Park Service also justified federal protection based on threats to
the wilderness recreation experience if the state allowed the creation of
dams. The riverway proposal decried:
The alternative to public protection and preservation of the area . . . is to
leave it to private commercial interests. Such a decision offers no real assurance to the public that the river, lakes, and natural environment of
the Allagash will not eventually be encroached upon by diverse industrial
demands.

The national recreation area proposal made it clear exactly what value the
proposed park intended to protect: leisure in a wilderness setting. The last
page of the proposal reads:
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Leisure experience in wilderness is among the most deeply refreshing
and stimulating forms of outdoor recreation, yet opportunity for it is
vanishing under the impact of technology and population growth . . .
there are few places left where one can live in, study, and enjoy the earth
in its natural design, and there is only one Allagash—one such resource
of its character and magnitude left in the East. It can, by default, become
another casualty in the ‘march of civilization,’ or it can be preserved as
an unspoiled country of adventure, a unique wilderness canoe route into
an age-old dimension of human experience.22

Park opponents, on the other hand, appealed to a different value, that
of economic development. Opponents attacked the park proposals for
their perceived negative impact on Maine’s economy. For example, Ben F.
Pike, of the Association for Multiple Use of Maine Timberlands, an organization that adamantly opposed a federal presence in the region, argued:
If the Allagash is to be administered by the National Park Service, which
would control access to and from the area, then the entire forest resources
of northern Maine would be seriously affected and wood-using industries of the state, which account for one-third of our economy would be
in jeopardy.23

A similar article opposing a federal park argued, “it would result in a
loss of substantial timber resources and destroy the woods industry of
northwestern Maine, thus crippling the pulp and paper industry of the entire state.” Opponents also argued in more specific terms, noting:
It is estimated that the railroads and trucking industry alone would stand
to lose over $1,000,000 annually, if the Allagash were closed; and local
saw-mills, individual woods contractors, farmers, chemical suppliers, forest machinery companies, would all be affected by taking this large area
out of timber production.

Additionally, park opponents argued that the Allagash region remained an
economically valuable forest, and therefore conserving it for recreation
was inappropriate. Articles noted that relatively scarce spruce–fir stands
occupied the Allagash region and that “the economic importance to Maine
of the spruce–fir stands in the Allagash far exceed[ed] the relative area involved.” Further, opponents argued conservation measures would diminish
timbering access to woods west of the Allagash. Publicity materials produced by the Association for Multiple Use of Maine Timber Lands articulated, with an Allagash park, “working access to the west would be very
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difficult” and that “continued access to and productivity of this land [wa]s
vital to Maine industry and to the general economy of the State.” John H.
Hinman, the honorary chairman of the board of the International Paper
Company, claimed an Allagash park “would effectively block an additional
million acres of productive forest land from economic use by Maine industry.”24
Park opponents also argued that Maine remained a relatively poor state
and that taking any timberlands out of the resource basket could prove
disastrous. For example, an anti-park article read, “Maine is not a wealthy
state. Its economy sorely needs the harvests from its 17 million acres of
timberlands which provide for a $500 million industry and employment
for 32,000 citizens.” This points towards another economic argument frequently used by park opponents, that of jobs. One Lewiston Journal Magazine article scathingly noted, “There are no jobs in the wilderness.” The
same article went on to argue that the timber in the proposed park area
could support 500 mill jobs annually and an annual payroll of $5 to $6
million.25
The economic argument deployed by park opponents relates to the social and geographic dynamics of the debate. National Park Service management would primarily confer benefits in wilderness recreation to people
from away, who would gain ready access to the region. Northern Maine
locals, the people most likely to be park opponents, already had ready access to the Allagash and felt it wasteful to spend tax dollars to expand infrastructure to promote visitorship. However, the larger national audience
did not feel as comfortable making a trip into the area with its peculiar
ownership scheme, dearth of publicity, and lack of the reassuring brand
and facilities of the National Park Service. Clearly, the debate revolved not
around access, but access for whom. Private ownership, as established, provided adequate access for local people and furnished jobs. Therefore, private ownership seemed to confer more benefits for locals, while the Park
Service catered to those from away. The debate also concerned a struggle
around the proper way of valuing the Allagash region: on the one hand, as
a resource for the local economy and, on the other, as a unique wilderness
recreational experience for a national audience.
In 1964, the Maine Legislature created the Allagash River Authority to
deliberate and make suggestions for management of the river. The agency
consisted of state officials and a University of Maine forestry professor.
After much consideration, in 1965, it announced its solution: the Allagash
Wilderness Waterway. Under this plan, the state controlled both recreation
and commercial activity on 145,000 acres of land and water. The State Park
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and Recreation Commission, not the National Park Service, maintained
management of the corridor. That same year, promoters dropped the Cross
Rock proposal after Congress approved funding for the more environmentally friendly Dickey–Lincoln Dam. With the dam situation clarified, in
1966 the Allagash Wilderness Waterway proposal passed. Officials utilized
an equal split of state and federal funds to acquire the 145,000 acres outlined in the Allagash River Authority’s proposal.26

Recent Park Proposals
Today’s park debates began to take shape during the late 1980s and early
1990s. Many groups, including the National Parks Conservation Association, the Wilderness Society, and the Natural Resources Council of Maine,
offered up multi-million-acre conservation proposals for the North Woods
region. Only one, however, received serious long-term consideration. This
proposal came from RESTORE: The North Woods. Wilderness supporters
founded RESTORE in 1992 to promote conservation amidst massive upheaval in the ownership patterns of Maine’s North Woods. The approximately 10.4-million-acre region historically was privately owned by approximately a dozen paper companies throughout the twentieth century.
This stability was undermined between 1980 and 2005, when a total of 150
transactions involving approximately 20,091,000 acres of timberlands—
or 88.7 percent of the state—changed hands.27
In 1994, RESTORE announced its plan for a 3.2-million-acre national
park in the North Woods. Larger than the state of Connecticut, the proposed park included such features as Moosehead Lake (the largest lake in
New England), the Allagash Wilderness Waterway, and the “100 Mile
Wilderness” section of the Appalachian Trail. The proposed park surrounded Baxter State Park and stretched all the way to the border with
Quebec. RESTORE’s vision tried to take into consideration the interests
of northern Maine’s people by including a national preserve that allowed
traditional activities like hunting, fishing, trapping, and snowmobiling,
activities typically not allowed in national parks. Also, RESTORE specified
that under their proposal the government would acquire land for the park
from willing sellers only with no landholders being forced off their property by eminent domain. RESTORE estimated that the land would cost
taxpayers between $320 and $960 million, or less than the price of one B2 stealth bomber.28
Despite RESTORE’s efforts to design their proposal with a variety of
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interests in mind, local opposition was fierce. People in the Greenville–
Millinocket–Patten area tended to oppose the idea of federal ownership,
viewed the loss of commercial forest lands as a danger to local jobs and
Maine culture, and disliked the idea of people from away dictating restrictions on recreation in the area. Groups like the Maine Sportsman’s Alliance
and the Millinocket Fin and Feather Club soon joined the fight against
RESTORE’s proposal.29
The debate played out along these lines for several years as RESTORE
generated significant news coverage and some grassroots support throughout the 1990s. By 2000, polls showed that almost two-thirds of Mainers
supported the park. However, while the population of southern Maine
strongly supported the park, local opposition in the North Woods remained relentless, and RESTORE did not appear significantly closer to realizing their goal. Then, in 2000, Roxanne Quimby inserted herself into
the saga. In that year, Quimby, who had made her fortune co-founding the
cosmetics company Burt’s Bees, made her first of many significant conservation land purchases in Maine. Quimby’s partnership gave RESTORE
something they previously lacked: the financial power to begin buying land
for the proposed park. In 2000 and 2001, Quimby bought five properties
totaling 8,667 acres for the proposed national park.30
However, soon after her first conservation purchases, Quimby’s relationship with RESTORE began to strain. Quimby, intensely independent,
did not like having to work within the confines of RESTORE’s mission.
According to Jym St. Pierre, Maine Director of RESTORE, Quimby
thought her association with RESTORE might slow down the achievement
of her conservation goals. Given these differences, Quimby chose to create
her own landholding organization, Elliotsville Plantation, Inc. (EPI). In
2003, Quimby formally resigned from RESTORE’s board of directors, and,
by 2004, her relationship with the organization ended.31
Shortly thereafter, the public temporarily lost some interest in the park
debate. In 2005, Plum Creek Timber, a significant landowner in the region,
proposed rezoning 426,000 acres near Moosehead Lake for residential lots
(including lakefront homes), a nature-tourism area, a lodge facility, an industrial timber-processing site, campgrounds, storage, and a store. The
proposed development lay within the bounds of RESTORE’s proposed
park, and Plum Creek’s proposal, rather than RESTORE’s, became the
most pressing threat to existing land-use patterns in the area. The public
debate thus shifted its focus to Plum Creek and away from the proposed
park.32
While the public spotlight cast its focus away from the national park
issue, Quimby evaluated her goals for her land holdings in northern
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Maine. In 2003, she purchased the first significant tract of land, 24,083
acres, between the eastern border of Baxter State Park and the east branch
of the Penobscot River. Quimby continued buying land in this area, and,
by 2007, she owned most of the land bordering the east side of Baxter State
Park. In 2011, Quimby announced her plan to donate more than seventy
thousand acres of land in this area to the federal government as a national
park. Now, with competing park proposals from RESTORE and EPI, the
national park issue returned to the forefront of the public’s attention.33
Also in 2011, Quimby made an effort to reach out to park opponents.
She expressed her intention to purchase land for an equal-sized national
recreation area that would allow traditional uses like hunting and snowmobiling if opponents supported her in creating the national park. Despite
the compromise effort, local opposition remained ardent. Quimby faced
a ferocious public backlash after giving an interview in Forbes magazine
in which she claimed that the way of life northern Mainers practiced did
not work and suggested they denied the need to seek alternatives to the
paper mill economy. Further, Quimby insulted locals by articulating that,
in Maine, “we have the most aged population in the country. . . . I believe
we have one of the highest adult obesity rates in New England. We
have . . . oxycontin abuse . . . [and] Maine’s the largest net receiver of federal
funds, even though we supposedly hate the Feds . . . it’s a welfare state.”
Understandably, locals did not appreciate being called elderly, overweight,
drug-abusing, welfare recipients. In the fallout of this interview, Quimby
realized she could not continue to be the public face of the national park
campaign. She became widely hated in the region, and her association with
the park allowed opponents to fight the park via personal attack.34
Quimby stepped out of the public spotlight and her son Lucas St. Clair
took the reins. As a Maine native, fisherman, hunter, and snowmobiler, locals found St. Clair a more palatable figure. He reworked the park proposal
to better suit local interests, and his relatable personality helped him come
across as more conciliatory than his mother. St. Clair unveiled a proposal
for a seventy-five-thousand-acre national park on the west side of the east
branch of the Penobscot, and an equal-sized national recreation area to
the east side of the river. The recreation area would allow traditional uses
like hunting and snowmobiling, while the national park would not.35
During the years since St. Clair became the public face of the park, several high-profile opponents became supporters and groups like the
Katahdin Area Chamber of Commerce and the Penobscot Nation have announced their backing of the park. Despite the upswing in public support,
Congress remained disinterested in creating another national park in
Maine. Realizing the inevitability of congressional inaction, St. Clair and
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park supporters lobbied for national monument designation in 2016 as a
stepping-stone toward the eventual creation of a national park. National
monument designation only requires an executive order from the President rather than legislation from Congress. President Obama, by 2016, had
already designated more national monuments than any other United States
President. In August, 2016, he chose to extend that record, designating
Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument.36
In 2017, President Trump ordered a national monument review and
re-opened the controversy in the North Woods. Soon thereafter, St. Clair
and other park supporters got some unexpected good news as Secretary
of the Interior Ryan Zinke, the man tasked with carrying out the monument review, announced during a visit to Katahdin Woods and Waters that
he might recommend that Congress upgrade the monument to a park.
Should Zinke do so, the controversy, already reinvigorated by the review,
would surely reach new heights.37
As of June 2017, Zinke had not yet delivered his recommendations to
the President or the public regarding the monument review. He has implied that he is not inclined to reduce the size of or rescind monument
designation for Katahdin Woods and Waters. However, he left open the
possibility of size reductions or management changes to some national
monuments, which may eventually impact Katahdin Woods and Waters.
Lastly, it is important to recognize that, while the EPI park received considerably more attention in recent years, RESTORE remains active, and
they still promote their vision for a 3.2-million-acre park surrounding
Baxter State Park.38
Geographic and social conflict characterized this most recent park debate ever since the early years of RESTORE’s proposal. In 2000, Bonnie
Docherty wrote an article on the RESTORE debate, which brought up environmental justice concerns surrounding the proposal. She explained that
park supporters came “most frequently from southern Maine or from
other states.” Further, she highlighted that “RESTORE, the driving force
behind the park is based in Massachusetts, and its Maine office is located
in Hallowell, just south of Augusta and far south of Maine’s ‘Mason–Dixon
line.’” Park opponents, Docherty explained, most often resided in northern
Maine. She wrote, “Northern Mainers repeatedly complain that the project
is the creation of outsiders imposing their values and desires on an unreceptive audience.”39
Docherty pointed out that the geographic nature of the debate also involved class conflict. The environmental justice model should be applied
to the park debate, she argued, not because supporters targeted racial minorities, but because the park proposal “targets one of the poorest regions
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of the state.” Docherty contrasted this with southern Maine, where park
supporters often come from, as a place with “more people, more jobs, and
more money.” Docherty’s interest in applying the environmental justice
model to the early years of the RESTORE debate indicates that, like the Allagash discourse, the most recent park debate began as a social and geographic conflict. This reality extends into the current debate around the
smaller national monument donated by EPI, as support is strongest in
wealthier southern Maine and beyond, while working-class locals bordering the park appeared most likely to be opposed to park creation.40
While the class and geographic dynamics of the current park debate
changed little over time, the way park supporters and opponents advanced
their positions regarding the two recent park proposals changed significantly. When RESTORE first began advocating for a national park in the
early 1990s, park supporters appealed primarily to ecocentric values. Park
supporters presented the forests of the North Woods as damaged by centuries of logging and offered a park as a way to recover lost wilderness and
return the forest to a healthier, more pristine condition. In a 1996 editorial
in the Bangor Daily News, RESTORE’s Maine Director, Jym St. Pierre,
wrote that, “Maine’s North Woods represent the greatest second chance
wildland area in our country. That the problem we face is not bad people
deliberately trying to destroy our forest, but a continuing loss of crucial
wilderness due to the cumulative actions of many reasonable men and
women.” St. Pierre continued that, while Maine “lost a great deal . . . it is
not too late to protect the best of what is left and recover some of the wildness that is gone.”41
During the early years of the RESTORE debate, park supporters also
promoted the park based on its ability to protect wildlife. In 1995, RESTORE’s founder Michael J. Kellett wrote an article that exclaimed, “Four
short centuries of careless exploitation have almost ruined [the North
Woods].” After explaining the twentieth-century threats to the North
Woods, Kellett articulated, “there is still time to restore this unique ecological region.” Kellett continued his ecocentric argument by pronouncing
that RESTORE:
has a vision of the North Woods as it once was and can be again. We see
a diverse, native landscape, where towering white pines preside over vast
ancient forests: wolf and moose, cougar and caribou roam the wilderness
in the timeless contest between predator and prey; and salmon, sturgeon,
and grayling spawn in free-flowing rivers. We envision a healthy, selfsustaining forest that is the summer home for countless tropical birds,
an immense reservoir of fresh water, a natural recycler of air, and a storehouse for carbon that would otherwise fuel global climate change.
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Kellett offered the proposed Maine Woods National Park as crucial to realizing this vision of the North Woods as a wildlife sanctuary.42
Park opponents, on the other hand, during the early years of the debate,
appealed primarily to a working-wilderness vision of Maine’s woods as an
inhabited landscape that humans improved rather than degraded by logging and enjoyed through traditional recreation activities such as hunting
and snowmobiling. While park supporters saw the North Woods as a damaged ecosystem that needed protection from human influence to return it
to its rightful wild state, park opponents viewed those same woods as part
of their home, a place not degraded but improved by human management,
a space for people to earn livelihoods and recreate.43
One of the best examples of the working-forest narrative of park opposition came from a 1999 letter to the editor of the Bangor Daily News,
written by Jimmy Busque, the President of the Fin and Feather Club of
Millinocket, which opposed the RESTORE proposal. Busque wrote:
As for their plan to turn much of Maine into a national park, we cannot
support the establishment of a federal park that steals the assets and
heritage of the people. This park would erect gates, charge fees, destroy
roads, stop hunting and trapping, and stop snowmobiling and float plane
use. In this proposed park there are 366,000 acres of public land, 300,000
acres of land under great ponds and all of the fur, fish, fowl, and game
that will be taken from the people of Maine. A private, working, sustainable forest in northern Maine will continue to provide needed renewable
resources for all, and many good jobs which accompany them, as well as
quality public recreational opportunities for all.44

Another anti-park argument stemmed from a similar ideology of the
North Woods. Stephen Schley, president of Pingree Associates, Inc., a Bangor forest products company, wrote in a Bangor Daily News article that
Mainers did not need a national park, because:
Maine’s public enjoys boundless public recreation opportunities under
a multiple use, private system of ownership that combines recreation,
wildlife management, conservation, and economically viable timber harvesting in a sustainable system that supports rural Maine economies and
a way of life.45

At first, the RESTORE debate, like the earlier Allagash debate, manifested as a clash of values. Park supporters appealed to preservationist values, while opponents appealed to conserving the working-wilderness ideal.
However, over time, both sides evolved to focus more on the economic
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“Proposed Maine Woods National Park and Preserve,” 2013, by RESTORE: The
North Woods, Hallowell, ME. Printed with permission from Jym St. Pierre.
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impacts of park creation to justify their positions. Stephanie Welcomer
wrote that, after 2000, the narrative espoused by park supporters “no
longer emphasized romantic wilderness values to the same extent.” Instead,
Welcomer noted that “the park narrative underlined economic benefits
and stakeholder legitimacy,” and “while ecocentric values were still very
much present in the later years of the RESTORE debate, they were no
longer the primary focus.” Park opponents, too, shifted their focus to arguments based on economic development rather than the working-wilderness ideal.46
An example of the growing ascendency of economic arguments comes
from Jonathan Carter, the director of the Forest Ecology Network in Augusta. In 2000, he wrote a pro-park editorial that focused exclusively on
the economics of the proposed park. Carter began by claiming that, “the
Maine Woods National Park and Preserve proposal could be a part of the
solution to the economic revitalization of northern Maine.” Carter then
outlined the economic declines in farming and forestry, the traditional
economic activities of the area. He wrote:
In the woods product sector we have witnessed an alarming loss of fiftyfour percent of our logging and thirty percent of our mill jobs. In 1960,
one in eleven people was employed in the forest industry. Now it is closer
to one in twenty-three. The Maine Department of Labor forecasts employment in this sector will decline by as much as seven percent by 2005
and the U.S. General Accounting Office projects a decline of twentyseven percent over the next fifty years.

Carter, typical of park supporters in this new phase of the RESTORE debate, offered a national park as the solution to northern Maine’s economic
woes.47
A year later, in 2001, RESTORE funded Thomas Power, an economist
at the University of Montana, to complete an independent economic report on the proposed park. The report concluded that the creation of a
park could provide a “new source of economic vitality” that would “help
to offset the unavoidable declines in the forest products sector.” Specifically,
Power predicted that a national park likely would lead to an additional
one-percent annual growth in employment in adjacent regions, equal to
about 100 new jobs per year immediately after the creation of the park,
and about 300 additional jobs per year twenty years later. Further, Power
predicted about 3,600 total new jobs and noted that average income in the
area would likely increase. While Powers did predict that the proposed park
would create an economic benefit, he carefully pointed out in an article
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he wrote for the Bangor Daily News that, “the proposed park would neither
do significant damage to the northern Maine economy nor would it lead
to a boom that would transform the region. Both sides in the debate over
the proposed park tend to exaggerate the economic impacts.” Despite
Power’s qualifications of the findings of his report, park supporters used
the report as ammunition for the economic argument for park creation.48
Park opponents responded to this heightened focus on the economy
from park supporters by moving somewhat away from justifications for
opposing the park based on the working-wilderness ideal and toward economic development justifications of their own, often by calling into question the perceived economic benefits of the park. In 2002, for example,
John Simko wrote an article entitled, “National Park Would Damage Local
Economy.” Simko served at the time as Greenville’s town manager and the
chairman of the Maine Woods Coalition’s steering committee. The Maine
Woods Coalition formed in 2000 in Greenville to fight the national park
proposal. Simko’s article pointed out that snowmobiling brought over $300
million in sales-tax revenue each winter to Maine, a figure that would decrease if a park restricted snowmobile trails. Similarly, Simko noted that
over fifteen percent of workers in Piscataquis County were employed by
the forest products industry and that these jobs would end with the creation of a national park. Further, Simko claimed that, when one tallied the
“truck drivers, the wood cutters, the mechanics, the diesel fuel delivery
drivers, the saw shops and logging equipment suppliers,” the number of
impacted jobs in the county would reach over 1,700.49
Simko argued that technological advancement and new investment in
forestry, not park creation, would spur economic growth in the area. He
pointed to $30 million of pending private investment in two new lumbering operations in Dover–Foxcroft and Greenville that would create over
one hundred jobs. Simko also referenced a wood composites business incubator that planned to open in Greenville in 2003 and a “world-class advanced wood structures laboratory located at the University of Maine in
Orono” as developments that could revitalize the industry. Simko concluded that, “the potential loss of 3.2 million acres of productive timberland would ruin all of these prospects.”50
Particularly in the years after 2000, the social and geographic tensions
of the park debate came into the spotlight. Park opponents renewed their
insistence that northern Maine locals should be the only actors in deciding
the fate of the North Woods. These opponents painted park supporters as
southern Mainers or people from away with no legitimate say in the matter.
In this later phase of the park debate, park supporters, more than ever, be-
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Photograph of Elliotsville Plantation, Inc.’s proposed park lands, 16 August 2015.
Courtesy of by Adam Auerbach.

Photograph of Elliotsville Plantation, Inc.’s proposed park lands, 17 August 2015.
Courtesy of by Adam Auerbach.
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came classified as outsiders unjustly interfering in the livelihoods of northern Mainers.51
An excellent example of this phenomenon came from Charles Horne,
a park opponent and news director at a radio station in Bangor. In 2000,
Horne wrote an article satirically advocating for a wilderness park in
southern Maine that would evict people from their homes and businesses
and destroy their economy and way of life. Horne made it clear that this is
precisely what he believed southern Mainers and out-of-state people were
trying to do to northern Mainers with RESTORE’s proposal. Horne classified RESTORE as a “Massachusetts-based group” and claimed that the
only Mainers “enthused about establishing a three-and-a-half-million-acre
wilderness park in northern Maine” resided in the southern part of the
state. He called park supporters “the ecological elite,” making clear the class
distinctions between north and south. Horne concluded, “just as the
Southern Maine Wilderness Park overtaking Windham and Scarborough
is an unworkable illusion, so too is the Northern Maine Wilderness Park.”52
Eugene Conlogue, town manager of Millinocket, reflected Horne’s sentiment in a popular bumper sticker he designed in 2000. The sticker read,
“RESTORE Boston: Leave our MAINE way of life alone.” This sticker, like
Horne’s article, suggested that if environmentalists from away wanted a
wilderness preserve, they should be willing to live with the consequences
of locating it in their own backyard rather than in northern Maine.53
Park supporters contested this vision by appealing to national interests,
as had Katahdin national park supporters in the 1930s, suggesting that the
park question remained a matter of importance to a much broader community than only northern Mainers. As Welcomer wrote of the post-2000
phase of the RESTORE debate, for park supporters, “the band of legitimate
actors [was] widened, highlighting the park’s local, regional, national, and
global significance for those of all socioeconomic backgrounds.” Proponents argued that the issue transcended northern Maine and, thus, outsiders deserved a say in the matter. RESTORE ultimately desired to create
a national park, which, by their estimation, validated participation from a
national audience.54
In the immediate aftermath of Roxanne Quimby’s smaller park proposal going public in 2011, ecocentric justifications for park creation resurfaced. Matt Polstein, the owner of the New England Outdoor Center in
Millinocket and a park supporter, said “Roxanne’s principal interest was
on the preservation side. She wanted more land preserved for the people
of the United States, and managed by a good steward, the National Park
Service. So she came about it more from the environmental and preserva-
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tion perspective.” As Polstein articulated, “while Roxanne clearly knew
[about economic benefits] intuitively, it wasn’t her focus.” As park opponent Anne Mitchell, the President of the anti-park Maine Woods Coalition,
put it, Quimby’s “early efforts to rally support for a national park in Maine
were laden with language encouraging conservation, preservation, and
protection of these lands for future generations of Mainers.” In an interview, Mitchell claimed that, in essence, Quimby’s plan originally called for
a national park to “save the environment from the damage of logging.”55
Understandably, this type of reasoning did not resonate with northern
Maine locals who traditionally based their livelihoods around the forest
products industry. In 2012, Quimby took her national park proposal off
the table, and park supporters abandoned the return to ecocentric discourse. When the new proposal for a national park and national recreation
area reemerged in 2013, the economics-first narrative established during
the later years of the RESTORE debate became dominant once more.
Quimby’s son, Lucas St. Clair, replaced his mother as the public face of the
park and marshaled the narrative of park support away from ecocentric
values and toward economic development arguments. Eliza Donoghue of
the Natural Resources Council of Maine, a group that in recent years supported the park, explained it in the following terms:
This whole economic argument is one that was a part of what Roxanne
had to say, but I think it has become a much bigger part of the conversation with Lucas [St. Clair] at the helm, and I think that people are
thinking about this project not just from a land conservation perspective,
but also from an economic opportunity perspective.

Similarly, Anne Mitchell wrote, “environmentalism is no longer the leading
argument, replaced by promises of an economic boost and increased jobs.”
More candidly, in an interview, Mitchell exclaimed, “here comes Lucas in
place of his mother with the ‘new’ plan. It’s not a new plan. It’s the same
plan, just different packaging. This time they’re doing it, quote, ‘for the
economy,’ instead of saving the environment.”56
Much of the economic focus that materialized after St. Clair entered
the spotlight rested on a pair of independent economic studies commissioned by EPI in 2013. Headwaters Economics, a Montana nonprofit research group, completed both studies. One of the studies analyzed the existing economy of Penobscot and Piscataquis counties, the two counties
closest to the proposed park. The researchers concluded that creating a national park and recreation area would likely not harm the local forest products industry, and that “as an economic development strategy a [national
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park and national recreation area] has the potential to stimulate tourism
and attract new migrants, including a younger population.” The other
study focused on the economic performance of “peer regions” that hold
similar characteristics to northern Maine, but also contained a national
park or national park and national recreation area. This study concluded
that the economies of the peer regions with parks or parks and recreation
areas grew faster in all cases than the economies of northern Maine’s
Penobscot and Piscataquis counties from 1970 to 2010. Overall, the report
predicted EPI’s proposal would create 450 to 1,000 jobs.57
Park supporters deployed the Headwaters employment figures as a
principal justification for park creation. For example, EPI created a publicity pamphlet that focused exclusively on the economics of the park proposal. The pamphlet began by stating that, “two peer-reviewed economic
studies looked at the impact a new national park and recreation area would
have on the Katahdin region and found that the combination of the two
would help create up to one thousand jobs in the region without any significant negative impact on Maine’s timber industry.”58
After St. Clair became the public face of the park, newspaper editorials
also focused more intensively on the economy. A June 2015 editorial from
Avern Danforth, the manager and past chairman of the Millinocket Town
Council, typified this period by treating the park proposal as an exclusively
economic issue. Danforth’s first sentence stated, “We need a serious conversation about jobs and how we can create more of them, particularly in
northern Maine.” Danforth proceeded to explain the reality of high unemployment in the towns surrounding the proposed park, and he offered
as the solution the 450–1,000 jobs expected as a result of a national park.59
Park opponents responded to this type of argument by voicing economic arguments of their own. They called into question the employment
figures in the Headwaters reports. For example, a flyer circulated by the
Maine Forest Products Council featured a heading that read, “1,000 jobs?
Unbelievable!” The flyer noted that Baxter State Park, larger than the proposed national park and national recreation area combined, only employed
21 full time and 40 seasonal workers. Further, the flyer referenced a University of Maine study that concluded Baxter State Park’s economic impact
equated to 87 full-time jobs. This number paled in comparison to the
38,000 forest products industry jobs statewide. Aroostook County, the flyer
claimed, underwent a forest products industry driven economic revival.
The flyer’s authors asserted, “that could happen here—if businesses aren’t
scared away by the restrictions imposed by a national park.”60
In addition to questioning the quantity of jobs created by the proposed
park, opponents also admonished the quality of the jobs the park would
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create. Opponents quickly pointed out the likelihood of low pay and the
seasonality of the jobs created by the tourism industry compared to those
created by the forest products industry. For example, a 2013 editorial by
Mark Marston, the co-chair of the East Millinocket Board of Selectmen
and vice chair of the anti-park Maine Woods Coalition, exclaimed, “these
forest products jobs pay a living wage, unlike the tourism jobs that ranked
among the lowest-paying in the region, according to the [Headwaters] economic study.” Marston, who typified the ideology of park opponents,
pointed to planned investment in the forest products sector as evidence
that forestry jobs could once again sustain the region.61
For both park supporters and opponents, a focus on the economic impacts of national park creation came to dominate the public framing of
the debate prior to the monument designation. In an interview, St. Clair
confirmed that the way people supported and opposed the park shifted
more toward economic impacts, exclaiming, “yeah, I think the strongest
argument has been around the economics, and the economic benefits that
parks bring.”62
Now that President Trump has reopened the park debate with his administration’s monument review, economic development arguments once
again take center stage. Articles and editorials published in the wake of the
review being announced point to the economic growth and investment in
the region since the monument’s designation. A piece by Patten Selectman
Richard Schmidt III, in honor of the one-year anniversary of the monument’s designation, even featured a poignant visual representation of the
economic focus of the discussion: the image accompanying the article was
a tree holding a birthday cake with a giant green dollar sign for a candle.
In the article, Schmidt pointed to new businesses that moved in to the area,
recent investment from existing businesses, and the uptick in the real estate
market. Schmidt wrote:
In the first five months of 2016, real estate transactions in Patten totaled
just over $528,000. Contrast that with the four months immediately following the monument’s designation, when there was $1.4 million worth
of real estate sales. The first five months of 2017 saw nearly $1.027 million in sales—a nearly 100 percent increase over sales during the same
period in 2016. Much of this is directly attributable to the monument.

Clearly park supporters’ arguments changed little after the monument’s
designation.63
Governor Paul LePage remains the primary high-profile park opponent
since monument designation, and it appears likely that his lobbying of the
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Trump administration is responsible for Katahdin Woods and Waters
being included in the monument review. (The other monuments in the
review are all significantly larger western parks.) LePage authored a letter
to Trump asking him to rescind the monument “before economic damage
occurs and traditional recreational pursuits are diminished,” and also testified before Congress to advocate for the same.64
Opponents, including LePage, still largely couch their position in economic arguments. For example, one anti-monument editorial, which appeared in July, 2017 in the Bangor Daily News began, “We’re being told the
economy of northern Penobscot County is on the mend thanks to the
Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument. Truth is it’s up just a
little. If we’re willing to settle for such a small improvement, let’s sign up
now.” The author, Doug Thomas of Ripley, Maine, argued that, over the
long run, northern Maine could do “so much better” by investing in the
forest products industry instead and that federal land management in the
area would foster disease, insects, and fire that could spread to neighboring
land owned by private individuals and corporations, crippling the area’s
wood-based economy. As Thomas’s editorial suggests, the language of the
debate did not change much post-monument review, with both sides still
primarily appealing to the value of regional economic development.65

Conclusion
Why is the current near-exclusive focus on economic arguments noteworthy? This narrow focus hides the more complicated dynamics that underlie the park debate. National park conflicts in northern Maine, played
out along lines of class and geography over the past century, continue to
tread familiar ground in spite of whether justifications are primarily economic or value oriented in nature. In the past, both proponents and opponents expressed these dynamics through value conflicts, and those conflicts persist and continue to drive the current debate in spite of the
increasing tendency for both sides to couch their positions in the language
economic of development. To ignore this is to misunderstand the foundations of the current debate.
Although they go largely undiscussed, the types of values beyond economic development that undergirded northern Maine’s historical park debates are key to understanding the nuance of today’s park conflict. The
value of wilderness recreation was essential to the elites who contested
both sides of the Katahdin debate of the 1930s. These elites differed, how-
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ever, in their valuing of Katahdin as a space meant to serve Maine or national interests. The Allagash debate of the 1950s and 1960s was characterized as a social and geographic conflict, pitting the value of the river for
wilderness recreation against that of economic opportunity through the
forest products industry. Similarly, the early stages of the RESTORE debate—ultimately a class and geographic conflict—pitted ecocentric values
justifying the park’s creation against a working-wilderness ideal that delegitimized the idea of a park. Park supporters today continue to be motivated by the values of wilderness protection, recreation, and land preservation for a national audience. Likewise, park opponents remain motivated
by the working-wilderness ideal, a desire to keep land in Maine managed
by and for locals and to keep the federal government out of the North
Woods. Though these clashing value systems continue to inform people’s
positions on the park, supporters and opponents have limited the discussion to the shared language of economic development, obscuring many of
the reasons people feel so strongly about this issue.66
This narrow framing carries with it serious negative consequences. By
focusing wholly on economics, neither side adequately engages important
questions like whether the land in question is worthy of a national park
or if federal land management actually creates ecological “good,” given that
EPI’s private ownership held the land in a state of conservation. As national
park opponents pointed out in the Katahdin debate, national parks often
bring development and high-use to wilderness areas. Eighty years ago, conservation-minded individuals levied this argument in opposition to national park creation in the North Woods, yet, surprisingly, to date, no
major conservation voice has questioned federal land ownership in the
most recent debate.
Most significantly however, under today’s economic framing, neither
side allocates the space necessary to discuss the full range of values that motivates its members beyond economic development. The near-exclusive
focus on economics ignores the value differences between park supporters
and opponents and prevents the possibility of meaningful discussion and
compromise as neither side can properly express why they feel so strongly.
Only by expanding the park discourse beyond this narrow framing and incorporating the full range of values at play can decision makers in northern
Maine work toward a model of conservation for the North Woods that will
work for both park supporters and opponents, locals and people from away.
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